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Although macroeconomic factors are part of several models for evaluation of credit risk, there is 
little effort to distinguish between effects of such factors and “intrinsic” factors on changes in 
credit risk. We argue that lenders, management, courts and traders in distressed securities would 
benefit from information about the degree to which macroeconomic factors affect changes in the 
likelihood of default in order to determine an effective approach to resolving a distress situation. 
A  model  for  decomposing  changes  in  default  predictions  into  macroeconomic  and  intrinsic 
factors is presented. The decomposition is firm-specific in order to capture the differential impact 
of the macro environment on firms. The model is applied to z-scores of GM and Ford during the 
period  1996-2008.The  macro-economy  has  affected  the  two  firms  in  different  ways  with 
implications for managements’ and creditors’ approaches to restoring their financial health.  
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Corporate Distress and Restructuring with Macroeconomic Fluctuations: 
The Cases of GM and Ford 
 
Banking crises in a number of countries during the 1990s triggered research on the role of the 
macroeconomic environment in corporate defaults. Most models for predicting bankruptcy use a 
set of firm-specific variables to predict bankruptcy or probability of default within a certain time 
horizon. Recently, a number of models employ macroeconomic factors as well.
1  
             The most well-known and widely used model for predicting bankruptcy or probability of 
default within a certain time period is Altman’s Z-score model (Altman, 1968). This and other 
default prediction models reviewed below employ market and accounting factors that themselves 
depend  on  macroeconomic  conditions  along  with  firm  and,  sometimes,  industry  specific 
conditions.
2 The Z-score model exists in a number of versions to allow predictions for firms with 
limited availability of market data and a recent version employs macroeconomic factors as 
described in Altman and Rijken (2011). 
Whether  or  not  a  default  probability  estimate  depends  on  explicitly  recognized 
macroeconomic  factors,  there  is  potential  value  for  management,  creditors  and  traders  in 
distressed  securities  to  dig  deeper  into  the  role  of  the  macro-economy  by  analyzing  the 
contribution of macroeconomic factors to changes in firm-specific predicitive factors. Thereby, it 
should be possible to determine whether an increase in the probability of default is caused by 
macroeconomic factors or “intrinsic” factors. By “intrinsic” we mean that the factors reflect 
firms’ inherent competitiveness based on firm- and industry specific conditions. We argue that 
distress caused by a decline in macroeconomic conditions does not usually require the same kind 
of corporate restructuring as distress caused by intrinsic factors. The latter factors are under 
management control to a greater extent than macroeconomic factors and they are less likely to be 
                                                           
1 See, e.g., Jonsson and Friden (1996), Chava and Jarrow (2004), Duffie et al (2005), Altman, Brady, Resti and 
Sironi (2005). These papers present evidence of a negative correlation between the business cycle and default rates, 
as well as between the business cycle and loss given default. 
2 See e.g. Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2000) for a review of models.  See also Allen and Saunders (2004) for a review 
of models of systemic effects on credit risk.   3 
mean-reverting. Macroeconomic factors are mostly mean-reverting as sources of fluctuations in 
aggregate economic conditions.
3  
 One  difficulty  in  using  macroeconomic  factors  fo r  predictive  purposes  in  default 
prediction models is that firms differ greatly in their sensitivities to macroeconomic events both 
in terms of type of events they are sensitive to, and in terms of strength. Thus, relevant 
macroeconomic factors as well as their weights are likely to vary from firm to firm in the same 
way risk exposures to, for example, exchange rates and interest rates vary across firms. 
In this paper we take Altman’s commonly used Z-score default prediction model and ask 
whether and how the scores produced by the model for a particular firm can be decomposed into 
components explained by macroeconomic factors, and components capturing intrinsic factors. 
The  objective  of  the  decomposition  is  to  provide  information  about  the  relative  weights  of 
macro-economic and intrinsic factors in the default prediction. This knowledge could affect the 
strategy for dealing with a distress situation by restructuring of assets, liabilities or management 
change, as well as the valuation of distressed securities on exchanges.  
The  decomposition  we  suggest  employs  observable  price  variables  as  indicators  of 
macroeconomic  conditions.  Quantity  variables  on  the  macro  level  are  excluded  if  possible 
because there is a longer lag before GDP and similar variables can be observed. Changes in price 
variables like interest rates and exchange rates are easily observed without a long lag relative to 
macroeconomic  events.  The  price  variables  signal  or  reveal  information  quickly  about 
underlying  disturbances.  Time  is  likely  to  be  essential  for  management  and  creditors  facing 
important restructuring decisions when a firm’s survival is at stake.  
In  the  empirical  analysis  we  use  a  method  for  decomposition  based  on  the  MUST 
(Macroeconomic Uncertainty Strategy) analysis in Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2008). This analysis 
is a tool for assessing a firm’s intrinsic competitiveness and macroeconomic exposures. The 
decomposition is here applied on the Z-scores for GM and Ford for the period 1996-2008.  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  Section  I  we  discuss  how 
macroeconomic and intrinsic factors affect near-term relative to long-term default probabilities 
                                                           
3 Aggregate factors influencing, for example, long term economic growth are obviously not mean-reverting. We are 
primarily concerned with sources of macroeconomic fluctuations, however.   4 
to different degrees and implications for approaches to distress resolution. Section II contains a 
review of different types of models for forecasting default and the role of macroeconomic factors 
in these models. The approach to decomposition of changes in credit risk into macroeconomic 
and intrinsic components is discussed in Section III. The case studies of GM’s and Ford’s Z-
scores are presented in Section IV. Conclusion follows in Section V. 
 
I. Macroeconomic Factors in Distress Prediction and Resolution 
Any proxy for the default probability of a firm (DP) must refer to a certain time horizon. In 
general this horizon is relatively short. Over a time horizon up to a year it makes little difference 
for the accuracy of the DP  whether a firm’s potential distress  is  caused by intrinsic factors 
reflecting  the  long  run  competitiveness  of  the  firm  or  by  macroeconomic  factors.  However, 
changes  in  DP  estimates  over  a  period  may  be  used  to  assess  the  longer  term  need  for 
restructuring and reorganization of the firm. Management and creditors may not want to respond 
the  same  way  to  an  increase  in  the  likelihood  of  default  over  a  12  month  horizon  caused 
primarily by mean-reverting macroeconomic conditions, as to an increase in the likelihood of 
default caused by a non-competitive product line, poor management or other “intrinsic” factors. 
  To illustrate the distinction between macroeconomic and intrinsic factors we define DP as 
a proxy for default probability over a certain time horizon and show that the information in DP 
about  the  likelihood  of  default  over  a  longer  time  horizon  depends  on  the  degree  of  mean 
reversion of factors affecting DP.  First, the proxy, DP, is expressed as a function of the value of 
the firm’s assets, A, and the debt to asset ratio, L:   
DP=f(A, L)+,                                                                                                                             (1)     
The error term, , can be interpreted as a measurement error. We express the value of assets as a 
sum of the value of intrinsic factors, I, and macroeconomic factors, M:  
 
A=I+M                                                                                                                                         (2)   5 
  The intrinsic value reflects the long run competitiveness and viability of operations and 
depends on, for example, strategy, operational efficiency, know-how, product development, and 
management’s ability to deploy and develop resources. Any shift in I as result of managerial 
decisions and changes in the competitive environment can be considered permanent i.e. non 
mean reverting.  
E[It+1]=E[It]+wt+1                                                                                                                         (3)                                                                                                                               
The  discount  factor  is  set  to  zero  and  w  is  a  shift  variable  without  mean  reversion.  The 
macroeconomic contribution to value, M, can be expressed as 
Mt=Mt-1+vt,                                                                                                                                (4) 
where <1 and v is a shift variable with expected value zero. Macroeconomic factors are not 
subject to control by management and they are mean-reverting. Any change in M caused by a 
shift  in  v  evaporates  over  time.  This  assumption  is  consistent  with  observations  of  mean 
reversion in stock markets. 
  Inserting (2), (3) and (4) in (1) we obtain that  
DPt = f((It-1+wt + Mt-1+vt); L)+ t                                                                                                (5)      
The observed change in DP in any period relative to the previous period is           
DPt = f((wt+vt+(1-)Mt-1); L)+t  (6)     
           This expression states that an observed change in the proxy for default probability may 
have been caused by an unanticipated shift in the intrinsic factor, w, a shift in the unanticipated 
component of the macro-factor, v, a change in the observation error, an anticipated change as a 
result of shifts in macroeconomic factors in earlier periods, and a change in leverage.   
  It follows from (6) that the expected change of DP over the next period depends only on 
the mean reversion of macroeconomic factor and the expected change in leverage. Thus, the 
effect of a change in DP, DPt, on any future DPt+i declines with the time horizon i if DPt is 
caused primarily by macroeconomic factors.   6 
  In most default prediction models the proxy DP is based on market and accounting data 
for a firm and these data reflect both intrinsic and macroeconomic influences on asset value, as 
well as leverage. Observation errors () also affect the observed DP relative to the actual default 
probability.  Even  if  an  observed  DP  based  on  market  and  accounting  date  captures  default 
probability with reasonable accuracy over the near term the long run implications depend on the 
source  of  the  observed  change.  To  the  extent  an  observed  change  in  DP  depends  on 
macroeconomic factors, a reversion can be expected over the longer term.  
In Section III we will decompose observed changes in a proxy for DP into intrinsic and 
macroeconomic components. Any change in DP can be considered a signal to management, as 
well as to shareholders and creditors, that action is necessary. The appropriate action may depend 
on the cause of the change in DP, however. 
 In the following we discuss how information about intrinsic and macroeconomic sources of 
change in the default probability in combination with leverage can be used by management, 
shareholders, creditors or courts to assess different types of restructuring procedures in response 
to distress. Valuation of distressed securities would depend on the weight of macroeconomic 
factors  in  the  prediction  as  well  as  the  approach  taken  to  resolve  distress.  We  consider  the 
following types of restructuring procedures:  
- Bankruptcy with liquidation of assets as under Chapter 7 in the US Bankruptcy Code. 
- Bankruptcy under rehabilitation procedures such as Chapter 11 in the US Bankruptcy Code and 
informal work-outs.  
- Change of management through hostile takeover, shareholder or board action 
- Substantial asset restructuring involving, for example, sale of assets, reorientation of strategy, 
partial closing of operations, etc. 
-  Liability  restructuring  involving  substantial  changes  in  capital  structure  including  reduced 
dividend pay-out, debt rescheduling and debt forgiveness. 
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A. Bankruptcy with Liquidation  
Bankruptcy occurs when the present value of the cash flows generated by a firm’s assets is less 
than the value of the firm’s debt. As long as the present value of the cash flows from the assets is 
greater than their scrap value, assets in place have value. If the assets in place have positive value 
but the value of debt exceeds the asset value it is common to talk about “financial distress.” 
Piecemeal liquidation would lead to an economic loss in this situation.
4 Liquidation of the firm 
as going concern may be efficient, however, if change in ownership and management could 
increase the value of the assets. 
    If the present value of the cash flows generated by the assets is less than their scrap value 
the firm is in “economic distress.” Even the debt-free firm is insolvent in this situation. Assets in 
place have a negative value. Thus, piecemeal liquidation is the appropriate course of action and 
ongoing operations should be shut down. 
Creditors in a leveraged firm would like to avoid financial as well as economic distress 
but as soon as insolvency is a fact shareholders with limited liability do not have incentives to 
avoid a further deterioration of the firm’s situation. As a result, it may lie in the interest of 
creditors  to  force  a  firm  into  bankruptcy  with  liquidation  already  in  financial  distress. 
Liquidation does not preclude that assets in place are sold in such a way that ongoing operations 
can continue. Bankruptcy procedures including cash auctions make it possible for the whole 
business or viable parts of it to be sold to new owners who can deploy and manage the assets 
better than current owners.
5  
  Liquidation is clearly an appropriate response to insolvency if the firm is in economic 
distress. Even  in financial distress liquidation may be appropriate if the distress is caused 
primarily by intrinsic factors and current owners are considered unable to redeploy and manage 
assets more productively. In this case the liquidation would enable new owners to  take over 
operations fully and partially. 
                                                           
4  See, e.g., Wihlborg et al (2001) 
5 See Thorburn (2006), pp. 155-172. Evidence is presented that in a system without Chapter 11 type law 75% of all 
liquidations end up as sales of “going concerns”. Thus the firms continue under different ownership.   8 
  If insolvency is caused by macroeconomic factors to a substantial extent it is less likely 
that management can be blamed for the insolvency. Liquidation can lead to value destruction if 
assets  in  place  under  current  management  generate  greater  value  than  the  scrap  value. 
Furthermore,  the  value  of  the  firm  is  likely  to  increase  once  there  is  a  macroeconomic 
turnaround. In this situation the restructuring of the following type should be considered.  
B. Bankruptcy under Rehabilitation Procedures and Informal Work-outs  
Chapter 11 in the US allows the incumbent management and current owners to retain control of 
an insolvent firm. Once in Chapter 11 management negotiates with creditors for debt relief, 
rescheduling of loans and possibly some asset redeployment or sale. As noted above, such a deal 
can  be  economically  efficient  under  financial  distress,  if  the  current  management  team  is 
considered qualified. In particular, if current asset values can be expected to recover, a focus on 
restructuring of liabilities in the short run can be economically efficient. In other words, the 
greater the weight of macroeconomic conditions in insolvency, the stronger is the case for a 
focus  on  liability  restructuring  under  rehabilitation  procedures.  Clearly,  current  owners  and 
management  must  have  incentives  to  manage  assets  in  the  most  efficient  manner.  Such 
incentives could be restored by, for example, debt relief that lifts the value of equity above zero. 
The implication of this discussion is that Chapter 11 procedures are appropriate if management 
performs  well,  asset  in  place  have  positive  value  and  macroeconomic  conditions  have 
contributed strongly to the distress.  
Many countries do not have easily accessible rehabilitation procedures of the Chapter 11 
type  that  allows  current  owners  and  management  to  retain  control  and  re-emerge  from 
bankruptcy.
6 The incentives for owners and management to negotiate informal work -outs with 
creditors are strong in countries lacking Chapter 11 type of rehabilitation procedures. Creditors 
also have an incentive to contribute to informal work-outs if the firm’s intrinsic value is likely to 
remain  positive  if  the  level  of  debt  can  be  reduced.  Thus,  if  macroeconomic  factors  have 
contributed strongly to insolvency, creditors as well as shareholders have incentives to negotiate 
temporary debt relief by means of bridge loans or rescheduling.  If the insolvency is caused 
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primarily by intrinsic factors, creditors could support debt relief up to a point where the intrinsic 
value of the firm’s assets exceeds the debt provided creditors have faith in the management team.  
        Under Chapter 11 the incentives to seek bankruptcy protection can be strong even if 
intrinsic factors are the major cause of distress since commitments to labor or other stakeholders 
with claims can be renegotiated. In this case it lies in the interest of the court to determine 
whether distress is caused primarily by macroeconomic factors or whether the firm is trying to 
avoid consequences of prior commitments or liability for damages it has caused.  
C. Change of Management  
As noted, Chapter 11 is most suitable for situations when creditors have faith in the owners and 
managers of a distressed firm. An increased probability of default caused by macroeconomic 
factors can be blamed on management only under specific circumstances. Specifically, a highly 
leveraged firm is likely to be relatively sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. Even so, the 
benefits  of  changing  management  in  response  to  an  increased  probability  of  default  caused 
primarily by macroeconomic events are not likely to be large. On the other hand, an increased 
probability caused by intrinsic factors can be interpreted as a signal that assets are deployed 
poorly or that strategies are not executed well. In this case shareholders as well as creditors 
would want to change management. Management can be entrenched, however, with the result 
that only a takeover makes a change in management possible. In cases when a takeover is not 
feasible, bankruptcy is the last opportunity to change management.  
D. Substantial Asset Restructuring  
A takeover usually implies that the incumbent management team is ousted. Thus, the team has an 
incentive to do what is necessary to avoid that the firm becomes a takeover target. In accordance 
with the discussion above, observation of an increasing default probability caused by intrinsic 
factors can be seen as a signal to management that substantial asset restructuring is necessary. 
This restructuring can be more or less far-reaching depending on level and rate of change of the 
default probability.  
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E. Liability Restructuring.  
Any increase in the default probability should always be taken seriously and management can 
never be complacent with respect to the deployment of assets. However, if the increase is caused 
by macroeconomic factors and it reaches an uncomfortable level it should be taken as a signal 
that the capital structure of the firm is inappropriate in the macroeconomic environment. Either 
leverage should be reduced or macroeconomic risk management needs to be strengthened. 
  In  summary,  a  increase  in  the  near  term  default  probability,  DP,  caused  by 
macroeconomic factors can be viewed as relatively good news for management since it cannot be 
blamed for this increase and the change in the observed DP is likely to be reversed. If intrinsic 
factors dominate the increase in the near term DP, shareholders and creditors need mechanisms 
for  removing  management.  A  takeover  is  one  such  mechanism  prior  to  insolvency.  Once 
insolvency  occurs  liquidation  under  bankruptcy  would  become  the  relevant  instrument. 
Bankruptcy under Chapter 11 would be appropriate if the insolvency is caused primarily by 
macroeconomic factors and assets in place have a positive value.  
  Valuation of distressed securities on exchanges can provide valuable signals about the 
expectations of market participants with respect to asset values, management quality and the 
contribution of macroeconomic factors to the extent there are market participants with ability to 
separate the impact of macroeconomic factors from intrinsic factors. 
 
II. Predicting Corporate Default in the Literature 
In this section, different type of credit scoring models will be discussed from the perspective of 
their intent and capacity to recognize the influence of macroeconomic factors in the estimation of 
credit risk. 
A.  Altman's Original Z-score Model 
From a wide range of book and market value ratios, Altman (1968) used Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis to identify the following model for predicting bankruptcy in the USA:  
   11 
Z-score = .012X1 + .014X2 + .033X3 + .006X4 + .999X5                                                                                         (7)      
where  X1 = Working capital / Total assets  
X2 = Retained Earnings / Total assets 
X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes / Total assets 
X4 = Market value of equity / Book value of total liabilities 
X5 = Sales / Total assets 
Z = Overall index 
 
  In  this  model  the  first  four  firm-specific  values  on  the  right-hand  side  are  given  as 
percentages (or multiplied by 100 if given as absolute values) whereas the final value is given as 
an absolute (number of times). For example if the X1-value is 10% the number 10 is used in the 
model.
7 From his original sample of 66 firms (of  which 33 did go bankrupt) Altman observed 
that, in general, firms with a Z-score greater than 2.99 did not go bankrupt and firms with a Z -
score below 1.81 went bankrupt within a year. Firms with Z-scores in between were in the “grey 
area”. 
  There is no independent role of macroeconomic variables in the original Z-score model. 
The  variables  constituting  the  score  are  affected  by  firm-  and  industry  specific,  as  well  as 
macroeconomic conditions. Thus, the contribution of intrinsic versus macroeconomic factors to a 
low Z-score cannot be observed directly.   
  Over the years Altman has presented modified versions of the Z-score. The Z’- score for 
non-traded firms substitutes book values for market values in the X4-factor. Another version, the 
Z’’-score model, does not include the X5-variable. This model should be used for analyzing 
emerging market firms and for non-manufacturers as well as for manufacturers. The classic Z-
score model is mainly applicable to manufacturers, such as GM and Ford. In the most recent 
version of the model Altman includes macroeconomic factors as well to estimate the “Z-metrics 
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Scores” and DPs of individual firms. This model is proprietary, however, (see Altman et al, 2010 
and Altman and Rijken, 2011). We did obtain relevant estimates for GM and Ford from this 
model, see Section IV below.  
Altman  and  Hotchkiss  (2005)  translate  Z-scores  into  probabilities  of  default  over  a 
specific time horizon by analyzing the relationship between Z-scores and default probabilities 
(mortality  rates)  for  corporate  bonds  over  their  lifetime.  The  Z-metric  scores  are  similarly 
translated into probabilities over different time horizons. Altman and Rijken (2011) show that the 
proprietary Z-metrics model performs better in terms of Type 1 and Type 2 errors for default 
probabilities. Given the restriction implied by the proprietary we here employ the original, non-
proprietary  Z-score  model  and  take  the  Z-scores  as  bankruptcy  indicators  in  the  empirical 
analysis below. Altman (2002, 2006) and Das et al (2009) show that the model has performed 
well for American firms on a one-year horizon and that it has outperformed the KMV model (see 
below) during recent years.  
B. Bankruptcy Prediction Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables 
As  noted  Altman’s  Z-metrics  model  adds  macroeconomic  variables  to  the  original  Z-score 
model.  Carling  et  al  (2007)  introduce  macroeconomic  factors  along  with  accounting  data, 
payment behaviour, and loan related conditions in a model of default risk for Swedish firms. 
This very data-intensive model explains the survival time to default for business borrowers in the 
loan portfolio of a Swedish bank that provided the data. By introducing macroeconomic factors 
the authors improve on predictions of the absolute level of the probability of default, while 
models without macroeconomic factors are reasonably accurate only with respect to rankings of 
default  risk.  The  significant  macroeconomic  factors  are  the  output  gap,  the  yield  curve  and 
Swedish households’ expectations about the economy.  
  Jacobson et al (2008) use a very large panel data set including all Swedish corporations 
(limited liability businesses) during a 12 year period to analyze factors that explain defaults and 
to derive probabilities of default conditional on firm specific, industry and macro factors. The 
authors compare out of sample predictions with and without macro factors. These factors are the 
same as those used in Carling et al (2007). The results indicate that default risk estimates are   13 
improved  by  the  inclusion  of  macroeconomic  factors.  Another  result  is  that  predictions  are 
improved by estimating the model on the industry level rather than the aggregate level. 
  The  macroeconomic  factors  employed  in  these  models  are  useful  for  the  analysis  of 
historical default data although the output gap and similar variables are observed only with a lag. 
As  noted,  this  observation  lag  is  a  disadvantage  for  the  internal  or  external  analyst  whose 
objective it is to determine whether changes in the probability of default depend on intrinsic or 
macroeconomic conditions. 
C. Bankruptcy Prediction Based on Option Pricing Theory 
Bankruptcy prediction based on option pricing theory was introduced by Robert Merton (1974). 
Using insights gained from the development of the option pricing model developed by Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973), he described the payoff from a default-risky bond in terms of 
the pay-offs on a risk-free bond and a put option on the value of the firm’s assets. The borrower 
holds a put option and its value depends on the value of the firm’s assets, the face amount of 
debt, the volatility of the asset value, the time to maturity of the bond, and the yield on a default-
free bond with the same time to maturity. The difference in yield between the default-risky and 
the default-free bond is the credit spread. This spread is a put option premium that increases with 
leverage and asset value volatility.  
The KMV model puts the Merton model to practical use as described in Vasicek (1997) 
and  Kealhofer  (1995,  1998).  KMV  Corporation  (now  owned  by  Moody’s)  is  a  company 
specializing in credit risk analysis. The model uses an Expected Default Frequency (EDF), which 
is firm specific and a function of the capital structure of the firm, the volatility in the returns of 
assets and the current asset value. The first step in estimating the EDF is estimating the asset 
value and the volatility of the asset returns. If all liabilities of the firm were publicly traded, it 
would be a rather simple task to estimate the asset value. As this is not ordinarily the  case, 
however, the value of the liabilities is estimated using the Merton approach. The second step is 
estimating  the  distance-to-default,  which  is  defined  as  the  number  of  standard  deviations 
between the mean of the probability distribution of the future  asset value and the so  called 
default point, defined as the sum of the short-term debt and half the long-term debt. The third   14 
and last step is relating the distance-to-default statistic to historical data on default frequencies of 
firms with different distances-to-default. Thereby, a probability of default for a firm is estimated.  
Like the Z-statistic, the EDF statistic depends on firm-, industry- and macroeconomic 
factors.  Thus,  the  contribution  of  macroeconomic  factors  could  in  principle  be  analyzed  by 
estimating the contribution of macroeconomic factors to volatility and asset values. 
D’Amato and Luisi (2006) and Tang and Yan (2010) examine how aggregate output and 
inflation affect the term structure of credit spreads. The  first-mentioned authors estimate the 
contribution of macro factors to EDF’s by assuming that that they are determined by the same set 
of indicators of real and financial activity as credit spreads. They analyze how spreads depend on 
the factors and apply the results on EDFs. Under these assumptions macroeconomic indicators 
have significant predictive power for future default risk. Dufresne et al (2001) also explain credit 
spreads incorporating macroeconomic variables.  
Pesaran et al (2005) link a global macroeconomic model to a credit risk model of the type 
described. They use equity indices, interest rates, inflation, real money balances, output and oil-
prices to explain changes in credit risk across industries and firms. Pesaran et al (2006) extend 
the model to consider diversification of credit risk. Opportunities for diversification depend on 
the importance of macroeconomic factors.   
The Credit Metrics model developed at JP Morgan (1997) builds on the models described 
but introduces the credit migration approach as well. It includes the risk of default of a company 
with  a  specific  credit  rating.    Essential  to  the  model  is  also  the  transition  matrix  stating 
probabilities of changes in ratings conditional on current ratings. These probabilities are derived 
from historical data. Macroeconomic factors can be introduced in the analysis as in the KMV 
model above.    15 
D. An Actuarial Approach 
CreditRisk+
8 is a model used by Credit Suisse. It focuses solely on the default risk, not the risk 
of credit downgrading. Probabilities are obtained using hi storical data. Within a portfolio of 
bonds the number of defaults per period is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution. 
  The main advantage of the model is that it is simple to use. There is no explicit 
consideration of macroeconomic fluctuations influen cing probabilities of default over time, 
however.  
E. Industry and Macroeconomic Models of Default Probabilities  
A few default prediction models rely entirely on industry-and macro variables. For example, 
CreditPortfolioView is a risk assessment model developed in Wilson (1997a and b) and adopted 
by McKinsey. It relates the default probability for a firm in an industry to changes in country-and 
industry-specific  variables.  The  model  assumes  that  the  default  probability  follows  a  logit 
distribution: 
Pj,t = 1 / (1 + e
-Yj,t)                                                                                                                        (8)   
Where Pj,t is the probability of default in country/industry j in period t, and Yj,t is an index value 
from a multi-factor model wherein country- and industry-specific factors are introduced. Using 
logit  estimation,  coefficients  expressing  the  contribution  of  each  factor  to  the  probability  of 
default within an industry can be estimated. Since the analysis is performed on the industry level 
it  is  assumed  that  firms  within  an  industry  are  homogeneous  with  respect  to  impact  of 
macroeconomic variables.   
III. Decomposing Z-values into Intrinsic and Macroeconomic Components 
Most of the default prediction models discussed so far use firm specific accounting and market 
variables or a combination of firm-specific and macroeconomic variables. The former variables 
are likely to depend on macroeconomic condition. Therefore, it is necessary to identify how the 
firm-specific  variables  depend  on  macroeconomic  conditions  in  order  to  decompose  default 
predictions into intrinsic and macroeconomic components.  
                                                           
8 See Credit Suisse, (1997)   16 
  To illustrate our approach to decomposition into intrinsic and macroeconomic factors we 
use Altman’s original Z-score model to obtain proxies for the default probabilities for firms. The 
same approach can be used to decompose other proxies.  
  The choice of macroeconomic variables in the decomposition of default predictions is 
based on two criteria. First, they should reflect the macroeconomic impact on a firm’s default 
probability as well as possible. Second, they should be observable as quickly as possible after a 
macroeconomic event. Speed is of essence for management, creditors and traders in distressed 
securities to act on the information about sources of change in default predictions.  
  The  first  criterion  implies  that  it  may  be  necessary  to  use  a  different  set  of  macro 
variables for different firms. The analyst needs to identify the specific macroeconomic factors 
that affect a particular firm’s default probability, as well as the strength of each factor, in order to 
gain information about the appropriate restructuring strategy in an approaching or actual distress 
situation.  
We  follow the MUST-approach  - developed by Oxelheim  and  Wihlborg  (2008) in  a 
Value Based Management (VBM) context - for decomposing credit scores or estimated default 
probabilities into macroeconomic and “intrinsic” components based on frequently observable 
variables. Following this approach a set of macroeconomic variables of potential relevance for a 
firm  is  identified  before  the  relevant  variables  are  identified  econometrically.  The  approach 
focuses  on  price  variables  as  indicators  of  the  impact  of  the  macro-economy  because  price 
variables are observed without much lag. According to economic theory changes in prices reflect 
underlying disturbances under certain assumptions about, for example, price flexibility. If these 
assumptions are not satisfied it is possible that both price and quantity variables are required to 
capture macroeconomic conditions fully.
9 We return to these issues in the case discussion in 
Section IV.    
  To observe the sensitivity of a firm’s default probability to macroeconomic variables we 
decompose the Z-score into two parts following the discussion in Section I: 
                                                           
9 The price variables are stable indicators of effects of macroeconomic conditions on a firm level indicator if there is 
a systematic relationship between a shock of a particular type and its effects on the firm level indicator and a group 
of price variables.   17 
Zi,t = ZI,i,t + ZM,i,t                                                                                                                           (9)      
In the above expression Zi,t is the total Z-score of company i at time t according to Altman’s Z-
score model, ZI,i,t is the intrinsic part of the Z-score of company i at time t and ZM,i,t is the part of 
the Z-score that depends on macroeconomic fluctuations. Thus, Z, ZI and ZM correspond to DP, I 
and M, respectively, in expressions (2)-(6). The Z-score also includes factors capturing leverage, 
L, in Section I. The Z-score model can be expressed in the following way: 
ZI,i,t + ZM,i,t = .012 X1,i,t + .014 X2,i,t + .033 X3,i,t + .006 X4,i,t + .999 X5,i,t                                                 (10)      
where X1 -  X5  are defined as in Equation (7). 
We  expect  that  each  of  the  Z-score  factors,  X1,i,t  through  X5,i,t,  is  sensitive  to 
macroeconomic  fluctuations.  Each  of  them  can  be  decomposed  into  an  intrinsic  and  a 
macroeconomic component:  
Xi,t = XI,i,t + XM,i,t                                                                                                                       (11)                                                                                                  
where Xi,t stands for one of the X variables above for firm i in period t. XI,i,t is the intrinsic 
component of this variable and XM,i,t is the macroeconomic component. The new Z-score model 
with factors that depend on changes in macroeconomic variables is: 
Zt = ZI,t + ZM,t = .012 (XI,1,t + XM,1,t) + .014 (XI,2,t + XM,2,t) + .033 (XI,3,t + XM,3,t) + 
          .006 (XI,4,t + XM,4,t) + .999 (XI,5,t + XM,5,t)                                                                        (12)                                                                                    
As expression (12) shows there are two ways to decompose a firm’s Z-score. Either the 
decomposition  can be performed on the total  Z-score after X1 through X5  have been  added 
together  or  each  of  the  factors  X1-X5  can  be  decomposed  separately  into  intrinsic  and 
macroeconomic components and, thereafter added to obtain ZI and ZM in each period. We choose 
the former approach and decompose Zt directly without decomposing each factor X1-X5. The two 
approaches should be equivalent if the macroeconomic contributions to the different components 
of the Z-score remain constant over time in relative terms. Even if the relationship between each 
component and macroeconomic factors are unstable over time, this alternative approach should 
be more robust since the relationship between the total Z-score and macroeconomic factors is   18 
likely to be more stable than the component relationships. The reason is that the impact of the 
macro economy can shift among the component variables over time.  
  As mentioned, the focus in the MUST-approach is on macroeconomic price variables; i.e 
on exchange rates, interest rates and inflation rates. The extent to which changes in Z in a period 
depends on changes in macroeconomic factors can then be expressed in the following way: 
dZM,i,t = ((ZM,i)/(e)) • det +((ZM,i)/(i)) •dit + ((ZM,i)/(p))•dpt                                                                 (13)                                               
In this expression det, dit, and dpt represent changes in sets of exchange rates, interest 
rates and price levels during a period. The partial derivatives show the sensitivity of the Z-score 
to  changes  in  the  macroeconomic  factors.  A  particular  firm  may  very  well  be  affected  by 
domestic as well as several foreign macroeconomic factors with different sensitivities. 
  Econometrically,  the  macroeconomic  influences  on  the  Z-scores  are  identified  in 
regressions with changes in Z-scores as the dependent variables and macroeconomic as well as 
industry and firm-specific variables as independent variables in order to account for possible 
correlation between macro economic factors and factors that affect firms’ intrinsic credit risk. 
  In  the  next  section  we  use  Z-scores  for  GM  and  Ford  to  illustrate  how  the  relevant 
macroeconomic price variables are identified, and how changes in  Z-scores  are decomposed 
period by period. 
IV. Decomposition of Z-score Changes for GM and Ford; Restructuring and Survival? 
In this section we begin by calculating the quarterly Z-scores for GM and Ford for the period 
1996  (1
st  quarter)  -  2008  (3
rd  quarter).  Thereafter,  we  regress  changes  in  Z-scores  on 
macroeconomic and industry price variables. The estimated coefficients for the macroeconomic 
variables are used to decompose the changes in Z-scores into changes caused by macroeconomic 
factors  and  by  intrinsic  factors.  The  decomposition  should  allow  us  to  observe  how 
macroeconomic  factors  have  affected  default  probabilities  for  the  two  companies  relative  to 
intrinsic factors during the period and their need for more or less fundamental restructuring in 
2008   19 
  The variables that together build up each Z-score were obtained from GM’s and Ford’s 
quarterly  statements.  These  variables,  defined  in  Section  II,  depend  individually  on 
macroeconomic factors but, as mentioned, we choose to decompose the Z-score rather than its 
components.  
  We regress actual Z-scores rather than estimates of corresponding default probabilities 
from Altman and Hotchkiss (2005). The Z-scores are the variables that were derived in the 
original default prediction model. It is possible that these scores do not translate into the same 
probabilities of default for these two firms as for the average firm. GM and Ford are two very 
large corporations that can be expected to survive lower values of distress indicators than most 
firms as noted in Altman (2002, 2006). 
  We have been given access to the proprietary estimates of default probabilities based on 
the more recent  Z-metrics model but these estimates do not go as far back as the Z-scores, 
however. Since the number of degrees of freedom is a critical issue we therefore work with the 
Z-scores which also can be replicated by other researchers.
10  
  The levels of the quarterly Z-scores are presented in the second column of Tables II for 
GM and Table  III for Ford. GM’s score has fluctuated between 1.83 and -.95. The score was 
actually declining during most of the period as Figure 1 shows. The corresponding figures for 
Ford are 1.86 and 0.015. Figure 2 shows also for Ford’s Z-score a trend wise decline over a large 
part of the period. The decline was slower, however, and Ford’s Z-score recovered sharply in 
2005.  
  According to Altman’s rule of thumb for his original sample of firms, these low Z-scores 
for the whole period for both companies would indicate that the likelihood of bankruptcy within 
a year was high during the whole period. Altman (2006) has later concluded that the rule of 
thumb stating that bankruptcy is very likely within a year if the score falls below 1.8 does not 
apply to very large corporations like GM and Ford. There is no doubt the scores are very low, 
however,  and  that  they  indicate  a  high  probability  of  bankruptcy  for  both  corporations 
throughout the period.  
                                                           
10 We regressed quarterly averages of daily Z-Metrics on the Z-scores and the log of the Z-scores. The variables are 
strongly positively correlated but their patterns are different enough to merit further analysis.   20 
  The changes in the Z-scores are shown in the third column of Tables II and III
11. These 
data are the independent variables in the regressions below. Thereafter we decompose these 
changes into intrinsic and macroeconomic fa ctors. The average quarterly change for GM in 
Table II is -0.026 with a standard deviation of .37. The corresponding figures for Ford in Table  
III  are 0.0065 and .31. The variation from quarter to quarter is substantial. For expositional 
reasons the data in Figures 1 and 2 are moving averages for three quarters.  
Insert Tables I-III here 
  Two regression results for changes in Z-scores for each firm are presented in Table I. The 
table includes only results for the final regressions after  a step-wise backward elimination 
procedure has been carries out. We have chosen to include coefficients at a relatively low level 
of significance (t-values greater than one) for the purpose of decomposition.  
  Before arriving at the results presented in Table  I the regressions for Z-score changes 
were run with a larger set of potentially relevant variables for each of the two companies. Since 
both Ford and GM are worldwide companies in the same sector the macro  variables for both 
firms included exchange rate changes, long term and short term interest rate changes and 
inflation variables in regions which jointly should represent US as well as global developments. 
The relevant independent variables were identified in a fundamental analysis of each company as 
answers to the following questions: a) where does the company produce? b) which are the 
company’s major competitors and where do they produce? c) from where does the company buy 
inputs? d) from where do the company’s competitors buy inputs? e) which are the company’s 
major  geographical  markets?  and,  finally,  f)  which  are  the  major  currencies  among  the 
company’s  financial  positions?  To  confirm  that  price  variables  are  sufficient  to  capture 
macroeconomic conditions we also included GDP growth in the US. Inclusion of this variable 
does not increase the explanatory value. Thus, we include only price variables that rapidly reflect 
macroeconomic conditions.  
  In the fundamental analysis of Ford 23 price variables from Europe, Japan and the US 
were identified as having a potential economic explanatory value. The fundamental analysis of 
                                                           
11 The changes are differences between two Z-score levels rather than percent changes because the scores are close 
to zero and negative values exist.   21 
GM  resulted  in  a  set  of  17  independent  variables  from  the  same  three  regions.  Among  the 
variables are 3-month and 10-year interest rates in the US, Japan and the euro area; the euro/$ 
and the yen/$ exchange rates, CPI inflation in the US, Japan and the euro area and PPI inflation 
in the same three areas. In addition, gasoline price changes in the US were included. Lagged 
variables were introduced with little effect on the results.   
  Both changes in CPI and PPI are included to capture the relative price change between 
these variables as well as inflation. This relative price serves as a proxy for the relative price 
between manufacturing goods and services. Instead of this relative price we could have included 
the relative price for motor vehicles as an industry specific price variable but the two relative 
prices are highly correlated.  
It can be debated whether the gasoline price should be considered an industry specific 
variable or a macro variable. It is certainly a variable beyond management control and it affects 
the whole economy but it may be particularly important for car manufacturers.  
The  dependent  variable  is  the  unit  change  in  the  Z-score  from  the  previous  quarter. 
Percent  changes  cannot  be  used  since  there  are  values  close  to  zero  and  a  few  negative 
observations. Exchange rate-, price level- and gasoline price changes are measured as percent 
rates of change for period averages relative to the previous quarter. Interest rates changes are 
measured  as  percentage  point  changes.  Period  averages  are  used  because  most  of  the  input 
variables in the Z-scores are quarterly flows. 
The results of the regressions are presented in Table I. Only a subset of the variables 
turns out significant in the two regressions since the correlations among several of the variables 
are high. Thus, only a subset of the variables is required to capture most of the macroeconomic 
influences on the Z-scores. The relevant macro factors for the two firms turn out to be different. 
The variables the two companies have in common are the US 10-year interest rate, CPI-inflation 
in Japan, PPI changes in the US and Japan, and the Yen/$ exchange rate. The coefficients for 
these variables are quite similar for the two firms. 3-month interest rates and the euro/$ exchange 
rate are not significant for any of the companies. Nevertheless, macroeconomic conditions do not 
seem to affect the firms in identical ways. There is one variable influencing only Ford’s Z-score   22 
(the 10-year euro interest rate) while only GM’s Z-score is influenced by Japan’s 10-year interest 
rate, US CPI-inflation, Europe’s PPI inflation and gasoline prices in the US.  
The US 10 year interest rate increases the Z-score for both companies while one of the 
other  10-year  interest  rates  affect  each  company’s  Z-score  negatively.  A  positive  effect 
indicating a declining likelihood of default can be explained by the  correlation  between the 
interest rate and the general level of economic activity. It can be observed that an equal increase 
in the 10 year interest rates in the three regions has a negative effect on the Z-scores of both 
companies. The magnitude of this global interest rate effect captured by the sum of the interest 
rate coefficients is nearly the same for the two firms although they are sensitive to different 
interest rates. Differences between the two firms are partially accounted for by US CPI-inflation 
affecting only GM’s Z-score positively and strongly. Inflation in Japan affects both companies 
negatively  and  to  a  much  smaller  degree.  PPI  inflation  (at  a  constant  CPI  inflation)  has  a 
negative effect on Z-scores in all cases.  
A depreciation of the Yen has approximately equal negative effects on the Z-scores of 
both  companies.  The  explanation is  most likely that a depreciation  of  the  yen increases  the 
competitiveness of Japanese car manufacturers.   
Another difference between the firms is that an increase in gasoline prices in the US has a 
significant and positive effect on the Z-score of GM but no effect on the Z-score of Ford. A 
possible  explanation  for  this  result  is  that  GM  benefited  relative  to  Ford  of  an  increase  in 
gasoline prices. During a large part of the period Ford’s depended to a greater extent than GM on 
relatively gas guzzling SUVs. It is also possible that GM responded more strongly to changes in 
gasoline prices with, for example, sales incentives. Sales is a variable with substantial influence 
on the Z-scores.  
  We turn now to the decomposition of the Z-scores and the changes of these scores in 
Table  II  for  GM  and  Table  III  for  Ford.  The  columns  “Macro  change”  are  obtained  by 
multiplying the regression coefficients in Table  I with actual changes in the macroeconomic 
variables for each period. The following expression shows how the macro effects have been 
calculated for Ford in each period: 
Macro change Ford =                 0.233 (change 10-year US interest rate)                                        23 
                                                 - 0.293 (change in 10-year euro interest .rate)                          
                                                 - (0.156 + 0.153) (Japan CPI inflation-average) 
                                                 - 0.082 (US CPI inflation-average) 
                                                 - 0.0181 (% change in Yen/$)                                                 (14)        
Inflation variables are defined as deviations from the period average in (14) in order to remove 
long term trend effects of continuous inflation. Such long term trends should be neutral with 
respect to the default probability of the firm.  
  The  coefficients  for  the  CPI  inflation  terms  are  the  sum  of  the  coefficients  for  CPI 
inflation and PPI inflation in Table I. PPI inflation per se does not appear as a macroeconomic 
variable. Thereby we have removed the impact of the relative price change between PPI and CPI 
from the regressions.
12 This relative price change is considered an intrinsic variable.  
   The  macro  effect  in  a  particular  period  for  GM  is  calculated  using  the  following 
expression: 
Macro change GM =                  0.225 (change 10-year US interest rate)                                   
                                                 - 0.290(change in 10-year Japan interest rate)     
                                                 - (0.232+0.296)(Japan CPI inflation-average) 
                                                 + (0.847-0.328)(US CPI inflation-average) 
                                                 - 0.300(euro CPI inflation-average) 
                                                 - 0.0183(% change in Yen/$) 
                                                 +1.826(% change gas)                                                        (15)                                                                        
   
                                                           
12 Note that a∆CPI + b∆PPI = (a+b)∆CPI + b(∆PPI-∆CPI). The left hand side of this expression appears in the 
regression. The right hand side consists of the inflation effect as shown in expressions (14) and (15) and the relative 
price effect which is considered intrinsic.   24 
The columns denoted Macro change in Tables II and III are obtained when actual changes in 
macro variables each period are inserted in expressions (14) and (15). The next column in the 
tables show the intrinsic changes each period calculated as the Z-score change minus the Macro 
change.  
  The mean quarterly macro change for GM is 0.045 and the mean intrinsic change is 
negative  -0.071.  Thus,  the  macro  effect  including  gasoline  price  changes  have  contributed 
positively to GM’s Z-score change for the whole period. The corresponding figures for Ford are 
0.001 and 0.005. Although the differences between total and intrinsic changes for the whole 
period are small, the average macroeffect made GM look better and made Ford look worse than 
what was caused by intrinsic changes in default probability. Thus, the average macro effect is 
smaller  and  the  average  intrinsic  change  is  positive  although  small.  However,  the  average 
changes hide substantial variation in the impact of macro variables as well as in intrinsic changes 
in Z-scores. 
  The final column in the tables shows levels of the Z-scores after removing accumulated 
macro effects under the assumption that the macro effect in the first quarter of 1996 was zero. 
We may call the figures in these columns the “Intrinsic Z-scores” for the two firms. The numbers 
are obtained by removing the accumulated intrinsic changes beginning with the Z-scores in 96 
quarter II after removing that quarter’s macro change from the initial Z-score levels.  
  Figure 1 plots three-quarter moving averages of GM’s Z-scores net of accumulated macro 
effects. Figure 2 plots the moving averages of Ford’s Z-scores and Ford’s intrinsic Z-scores net 
of accumulated macro effects.   
Insert Figures 1-2 here 
  The GM plots show greater impact and greater variation of the impact of the macro 
economy on the Z-scores than on the Ford plot. In Figure 1 the “Intrinsic Z-score” fluctuated 
around the actual Z-score until mid 2004. Thereafter, were it not for the macroeffect GM’s Z-
score would have been falling almost continuously until the end of the data period in the third 
quarter of 2008. The macro effect even contributed to a slight increase in GM’s Z-score from 
2004 through 2006. Through 2007 and 2008 both the actual and the “intrinsic” Z-score fell 
dramatically. The latter even became negative. Thus, the macro-effect obscured the steep decline   25 
in GM’s intrinsic ability to survive. This intrinsic decline was almost continuous beginning in 
2003.  
  Turning  to  Ford  in  Figure  2  it  seems  that  the  macro-economy  helped  Ford  “muddle 
through”  from  late 1998 into the  year 2000 and, perhaps,  even survive the period from  the 
middle of 2003 until the middle of 2005. During the latter period Ford’s “intrinsic Z-score” fell 
to zero before it turned up sharply in the middle of 2005. Thereafter the actual and the intrinsic 
Z-score have recovered and followed each other fairly closely up to a level above 1. This level is 
still  not  “safe”  but  it  seems  appropriate  that  Ford’s  recent  restructuring  has  been  managed 
internally by the incumbent management and with less divestment than GM.  
  The discussion of approaches to restructuring in Section I would lead to the conclusion 
that the appropriate action for GM would probably be Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2008 or earlier. 
With the benefit of hindsight we know that a Chapter 11 bankruptcy was engineered by the US 
government but it was in many ways similar to a pre-packaged Chapter7 bankruptcy. The old 
GM management was replaced, the government took over majority ownership and parts of the 
company  in  “economic  distress”  were  shut  down.  Thus,  the  actions  taken  are  very  much 
consistent with the needs of firms with the intrinsic Z-scores we observe in Figure 1.  
  One may ask whether the restructuring of Ford initiated by its management in 2005 could 
have been initiated already in 2003 if macroeconomic factors had not obscured how close to 
bankruptcy Ford was? Similarly, GM’s bankruptcy may have occurred already in 2005 or 2006 if 
macroeconomic factors and gasoline price developments, in particular had not contributed to 
keeping the bankruptcy indicators from falling until early in 2007. 
 
V. Conclusion 
We have here suggested that - in order to improve the reconstruction decision - indicators of the 
probability  of  corporate  default,  or  changes  therein,  should  be  decomposed  into  a 
macroeconomic and an intrinsic component with attention paid to the firm-specific character of 
the  macroeconomic  influences.  If  a  declining  value  of  the  indicator  of  default  is  explained 
primarily  by  macroeconomic  factors  a  reduction  in  leverage,  improved  macroeconomic  risk   26 
management or relatively light assets restructuring may be sufficient to reduce the probability of 
default. In case of insolvency, rehabilitation under Chapter 11 with the incumbent management 
in  place  can  be  an  appropriate  procedure.  If  instead  the  declining  value  of  the  indicator  is 
explained  by  intrinsic  factors,  a  change  of  management  may  be  necessary  to  effectively 
implement fundamental asset restructuring. A takeover is one possibility while bankruptcy under 
Chapter 7 may be necessary in case of actual insolvency. 
  The method of decomposition we propose relies on market price variables on the macro-, 
industry-  and  firm  levels  to  obtain coefficients  for the sensitivity of the default indicator to 
changes  in  the different price variables. We focus  on price variables  because they  are most 
easily,  frequently,  and  quickly  observed,  and  they  should  be  systematically  related  to  the 
underlying fundamental factors.  
  Once the coefficients are estimated, observations of changes in the macro variables can 
be used to calculate the total macroeconomic impact on the default indicator for a period. The 
remaining change in the indicator during a period is considered caused by intrinsic factors.  
  Altman’s Z-score was used as the indicator of default probability to illustrate the practical 
use of the method. The Z-scores for GM and Ford were calculated and the quarterly changes 
from 1996 through the third quarter of 2008 were decomposed into macroeconomic and intrinsic 
components. Rising gas prices in 2005 and 2006 seem to have kept GM’s Z-score from falling 
even more by increasing its competitiveness relative to Ford and possibly delayed bankruptcy. 
Nevertheless,  bankruptcy  involving management  change and substantial divestment  of assets 
seems to have been an appropriate course of action once it occurred. Ford’s Z-scores seem to 
have been kept up by macroeconomic developments that obscured the need for restructuring 
during a couple of years before the millennium change and during a period before mid-2005. 
Thereafter the actual and intrinsic Z-scores have improved to a level consistent with survival 
under the leadership of the incumbent management team. For the two companies in the same 
industry and with about the same Z-value in 2005 we end up with different suggested ways of 
reconstruction once we take into account the firm-specific macroeconomic influences on the 
distress probability. 
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Table I   Changes in Ford and GM Z-scores, Quarterly, 1996 II – 2008 III 
This table shows results of OLS regressions with changes in Z-scores of Ford and GM as dependent 
variables. Coefficients with t-values below one were eliminated by stepwise backward elimination of 






















Note: Coefficients in regressions after stepwise backward elimination 






U.S. 3 month Int. Rate, 
change 
-  - 
Japan 3 month int. Rate, 
change 
-  - 
Euro 3 month int. Rate, 
change 
-  - 






Japanese 10 year Int. Rate, 
change 
  -0.290 
(-1.11) 





U.S. CPI, % change 
-  0.847 
(2.79) 





CPI Germany, % change  -  - 










Euro PPI, % change 
-  -0.300 
(-1.83) 
US gasoline price,  
% change 
-  1.826 
(2.52) 





Euro/$, % change/100  -  - 
R square  0.19  0.40 
Adjusted R square  0.08  0.26 
Observations  50  50   31 
 
Table II. GM Z-score decomposition from 2
nd Quarter 1996-3
rd Quarter 2008.  
The table shows how Z-scores and  Z-score changes for GM have been decomposed into macroeconomic 
and intrinsic components. Column 1 shows the year and quarter for Z-score levels in column 2. Column 3 
shows the change of the Z-score from the previous quarter. Column 4 shows the Z-score change caused 
by macroeconomic factors. The figures are obtained by multiplication of actual changes in macro-
variables times corresponding coefficients in Table I. Column 5 represents the intrinsic changes in Z-
scores calculated as the difference between columns 3 and 4. Intrinsic changes are accumulated in 













GM Z-score net 
of macro-effect  
= Net of 
accumulated 
intrinsic change 
1996-2  1.83  0.28  0.49     1.35 
1996-3  1.61  -0.22  -0.04  -0.18  1.17 
1996-4  1.16  -0.45  0.11  -0.56  0.61 
1997-1  1.70  0.54  -0.05  0.58  1.19 
1997-2  1.76  0.06  0.17  -0.10  1.09 
1997-3  1.55  -0.22  -0.23  0.02  1.10 
1997-4  1.03  -0.51  -0.33  -0.18  0.92 
1998-1  1.21  0.18  -0.62  0.79  1.72 
1998-2  1.18  -0.03  -0.13  0.10  1.81 
1998-3  0.96  -0.22  -0.19  -0.03  1.78 
1998-4  0.93  -0.03  0.05  -0.08  1.71 
1999-1  1.03  0.11  -0.41  0.52  2.22 
1999-2  1.09  0.05  0.76  -0.71  1.51 
1999-3  0.98  -0.11  0.46  -0.57  0.95 
1999-4  0.63  -0.35  0.16  -0.51  0.44 
2000-1  0.98  0.35  0.28  0.07  0.51 
2000-2  0.98  -0.01  0.32  -0.33  0.18 
2000-3  0.84  -0.14  0.02  -0.16  0.03 
2000-4  0.93  0.09  -0.15  0.24  0.26 
2001-1  0.86  -0.07  -0.13  0.06  0.33 
2001-2  0.96  0.11  0.33  -0.23  0.10 
2001-3  0.83  -0.13  -0.38  0.25  0.35 
2001-4  0.77  -0.06  -0.98  0.92  1.28 
2002-1  0.80  0.02  -0.27  0.29  1.57   32 
2002-2  0.94  0.15  0.38  -0.24  1.33 
2002-3  0.55  -0.39  -0.21  -0.18  1.15 
2002-4  0.59  0.04  -0.03  0.06  1.21 
2003-1  0.83  0.24  0.44  -0.21  1.01 
2003-2  0.92  0.09  -0.22  0.31  1.31 
2003-3  0.94  0.02  0.11  -0.09  1.23 
2003-4  0.70  -0.23  -0.18  -0.06  1.17 
2004-1  0.56  -0.15  0.08  -0.23  0.94 
2004-2  0.49  -0.07  0.33  -0.40  0.54 
2004-3  0.44  -0.05  -0.11  0.06  0.60 
2004-4  0.51  0.07  0.26  -0.19  0.42 
2005-1  0.40  -0.11  0.05  -0.16  0.26 
2005-2  0.49  0.09  0.24  -0.16  0.10 
2005-3  0.55  0.06  0.39  -0.33  -0.23 
2005-4  0.17  -0.38  -0.10  -0.29  -0.52 
2006-1  1.01  0.84  0.09  0.75  0.23 
2006-2  0.72  -0.29  0.61  -0.90  -0.67 
2006-3  0.51  -0.21  -0.01  -0.20  -0.87 
2006-4  0.64  0.13  -0.63  0.75  -0.12 
2007-1  1.05  0.41  -0.01  0.41  0.30 
2007-2  1.04  -0.01  0.40  -0.41  -0.11 
2007-3  0.57  -0.48  -0.06  -0.42  -0.52 
2007-4  0.40  -0.16  0.11  -0.27  -0.79 
2008-1  0.53  0.13  0.27  -0.14  -0.93 
2008-2  -0.95  -1.48  0.41  -1.88  -2.82 
2008-3  0.28  1.22  0.38  0.84  -1.97 
                 
Mean  0.829  -0.026  0.045  -0.071  0.528 
                 
Std Dev  0.451  0.372  0.335  0.481  0.978 
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Table III. Ford Z-score decomposition from 2
nd Quarter 1996 - 3
rd Quarter 2008. 
The table shows how Z-scores and Z-score changes for Ford have been decomposed into 
macroeconomic and intrinsic components. Column 1 shows the year and quarter for Z-score levels in 
column 2. Column 3 shows the change of the Z-score from the previous quarter. Column 4 shows the Z-
score change caused by macroeconomic factors. The figures are obtained by multiplication of actual 
changes in macro-variables times corresponding coefficients in Table I. Column 5 represents the intrinsic 
changes in Z-scores calculated as the difference between columns 3 and 4. Intrinsic changes are 















Ford Z-score net of 
macro-effect  =  net 
of accumulated 
intrinsic change 
1996-2  1.08  0.09  0.07     1.01 
1996-3  0.91  -0.17  0.00  -0.16  0.84 
1996-4  1.02  0.10  -0.03  0.14  0.98 
1997-1  1.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  0.99 
1997-2  1.15  0.14  0.15  -0.02  0.97 
1997-3  0.99  -0.16  -0.18  0.02  0.99 
1997-4  0.67  -0.32  -0.23  -0.09  0.91 
1998-1  1.87  1.19  0.10  1.09  2.00 
1998-2  1.23  -0.64  -0.12  -0.52  1.48 
1998-3  0.99  -0.24  0.14  -0.37  1.11 
1998-4  1.07  0.08  0.27  -0.19  0.91 
1999-1  1.13  0.06  0.13  -0.08  0.84 
1999-2  1.18  0.05  0.05  0.00  0.83 
1999-3  0.99  -0.19  0.09  -0.28  0.55 
1999-4  1.11  0.12  0.05  0.07  0.62 
2000-1  1.08  -0.03  -0.08  0.05  0.67 
2000-2  1.01  -0.07  -0.02  -0.05  0.62 
2000-3  0.85  -0.16  -0.09  -0.07  0.55 
2000-4  0.86  0.01  -0.13  0.15  0.69 
2001-1  0.85  -0.01  -0.17  0.17  0.86 
2001-2  0.58  -0.28  -0.04  -0.23  0.62 
2001-3  0.49  -0.09  0.01  -0.11  0.52 
2001-4  0.38  -0.11  -0.08  -0.02  0.50 
2002-1  0.74  0.36  -0.05  0.40  0.90 
2002-2  0.71  -0.03  0.11  -0.13  0.76   34 
2002-3  0.61  -0.10  0.01  -0.11  0.65 
2002-4  0.76  0.15  -0.01  0.16  0.81 
2003-1  0.83  0.06  0.14  -0.07  0.74 
2003-2  0.59  -0.24  0.00  -0.24  0.50 
2003-3  0.52  -0.07  0.14  -0.20  0.30 
2003-4  0.69  0.17  0.09  0.08  0.37 
2004-1  0.83  0.14  0.02  0.13  0.50 
2004-2  0.56  -0.27  0.07  -0.34  0.16 
2004-3  0.48  -0.08  -0.04  -0.04  0.12 
2004-4  0.66  0.18  0.16  0.01  0.14 
2005-1  0.80  0.14  0.05  0.09  0.23 
2005-2  0.62  -0.18  -0.01  -0.17  0.06 
2005-3  0.56  -0.06  0.00  -0.06  0.00 
2005-4  0.15  -0.40  -0.12  -0.28  -0.28 
2006-1  1.16  1.01  -0.02  1.02  0.74 
2006-2  1.38  0.23  -0.01  0.23  0.98 
2006-3  1.05  -0.33  -0.07  -0.26  0.72 
2006-4  1.11  0.06  -0.01  0.07  0.79 
2007-1  1.45  0.34  -0.05  0.39  1.17 
2007-2  1.54  0.10  -0.14  0.23  1.40 
2007-3  1.44  -0.10  0.10  -0.19  1.21 
2007-4  1.16  -0.28  -0.05  -0.23  0.99 
2008-1  1.36  0.20  0.12  0.08  1.06 
2008-2  0.97  -0.39  -0.19  -0.21  0.86 
2008-3  1.31  0.34  -0.06  0.40  1.26 
                 
Mean  0.93  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.74 
                 
Std Dev  0.33  0.31  0.11  0.29  0.41 
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Figure1. GM Z-score and “intrinsic” Z-score after removal of macroeconomic effects 
The figure plots 3-quarter moving averages of GM’s actual Z-scores and intrinsic (net of macroeconomic 














Moving Average-Z Score Net of Macro Moving Average-Actual Z Score  36 
Figure 2. Ford Z-score and “intrinsic” Z-score after removal of macroeconomic effects 
The figure plots 3-quarter moving averages of Ford’s actual Z-scores and intrinsic (net of macroeconomic 
effects) Z-scores. The data are obtained from Table III. 
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